Who profits from peace in Afghanistan?

In light of the ever-increasing American influence in Central Asia, most prominently in Uzbekistan, during the ongoing "war on terror," President Vladimir Putin of Russia seems to be searching for new ways to assert his government's hegemony over this former Soviet domain. In October and November, President George W. Bush linked American security guarantees to the use of Uzbek air and logistics bases for military operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Caspian oil. The giants of America's energy industry, as well as the US Department of Energy, have a significant role in the extraction and transportation of Caspian Sea oil, including owning a significant portion of the recently completed Caspian Pipeline Consortium linking Kazakhstan to Russia. Of further interest is the recent American overture to Tajikistan, until recently considered to be a bastion of Russian influence in the region.
Currently, Tajikistan, which shares a 750-mile border with Afghanistan, allows use of its airspace only for humanitarian and search-and-rescue operations. In a recent stopover during his Central Asian tour, the US defense secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, reached a tentative agreement with the Tajik president, Imomali Rahmonov, on the possible use of Tajik airbases and the expansion of airspace permission to include military sorties.
This is a crucial staging area - and Washington is already looking at its use in post-Taliban Afghanistan. In an ironic twist of fate, one of the three airfields currently being assessed for suitability in handling a major American air contingent is Kulyab airbase, located approximately 60 miles from the Afghan border.
During the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan, the Soviets refurbished and expanded Kulyab in order to make it capable of handling both fighter aircraft and large transport planes - precisely the dual-role capability for which the United States has been looking. While it is extremely unlikely that a single American fighter will remain on Tajik soil after the demise of the Taliban, any long-term agreement with the international community regarding use of Kulyab is likely to challenge the Kremlin's ongoing pursuit of "zones of influence" over newly independent countries. Clearly, Moscow wants to keep the area firmly within its sphere of influence. But Washington has other ideas.
Much like UN and NATO operations in the former Yugoslavia, post-Taliban peacekeeping/nation-building monitoring force logistics and staging bases are unlikely to be confined to the country of conflict. The proximity of Kulyab and its potential utility as an entry point for supplies and personnel make it ideal for continued use long after the last rounds have been fired in Afghanistan. The influx of personnel and capital required to expand the airfield, build logistics staging areas and airfield housing, and improve road networks into Afghanistan could potentially jumpstart the Tajik economy and make it less reliant on Russia. Tajikistan, one of the world's poorest countries, has relied on the Russians in economic and security matters since 1991, including the use of Russian Army elements along its southern border with Afghanistan. In the light of a decade of patronage towards Dushanbe, Putin is taking continued exclusive relations for granted. That looks like a mistake.
Asia-Pacific. In an effort to counter growing American influence in the region, President Putin met both with President Rahmonov and with the leader of the Northern Alliance's political wing, Burhanuddi Rabbani, during a stopover on his return from the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum summit held in Shanghai in late October. By focusing so closely on growing American influence in the region and trying so persistently to counter it, Putin may be overlooking a more gradual loss of Russian influence in Dushanbe at the hands of the international community as a whole.
Considering past experience and current American statements, the United States has little interest in remaining in Central Asia over the long haul. Excepting possible threats to US interests in the free-market exploitation of Caspian Sea oil, it is unlikely that the United States will focus on Central Asia after the war ends. However, the influx of humanitarian aid into Tajikistan - albeit destined ultimately for Afghanistan - will exponentially speed up the benefits of the global economy for the impoverished Tajiks. Germany has already dispatched its foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, to Dushanbe in order to discuss improving the Tajik infrastructure to facilitate the movement of humanitarian aid through Tajikistan.
The European Union as a whole provides Tajikistan with almost 20 million euros ($18 million) in aid every year - to compete with growing American influence in Tajikistan. When all is said and done, Dushanbe will clearly benefit economically from the current war and the post-war arrangements, and Russia may lose its hegemonic aspirations in Central Asia - but not necessarily to the rival it thinks.