Asian Tsunami's strategic implications (page 2 of 2)

Peace talks following this ceasefire were unsuccessful. Indonesian President Sukarnoputri launched a full-scale assault on GAM, deploying some 30,000 TNI soldiers, backed by 10,000 police. From May to December 2004, the approximately 5,000 GAM fighters were once again on the military defensive - and then the tsunami struck with devastating force. If we consider that between 1976-2004 during the GAM separatist struggle around 12,000 lives were lost, the number of lives taken by the Asian Tsunami in Aceh on a single day is estimated by the Indonesian Health Ministry as 166,320 and 50,000 missing - a mammoth toll. And while GAM commanders insist that the tsunami caused little damage to their paramilitary capabilities, (much of the guerrilla group retreated to the mountain areas of their troubled province prior to the tsunami), GAM's ability to recruit new fighters is considerably damaged. With much of the Acehnese capital, Bandar Aceh, and other significant coastal communities destroyed, priorities are focussed on aid delivery and reconstruction - not independence. Jakarta's ability to control the arrival and distribution of foreign aid to the stricken province placed GAM on the political back-foot and gave Indonesia the advantage.

The Indonesian government is now in a very interesting position. Desperate to bring the war to a favourable conclusion, and unable to force the Acehnese into giving up their struggle for independence by force alone, Jakarta has used a combination of military force and deft diplomacy to coax GAM back to the negotiating table. Indonesia's new president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, almost 100 days into his first term, seized the 'opportunity' the tsunami provided. By visiting the province and appearing genuinely concerned over the plight of the Acehnese, Yudhoyono has certainly captured the public relations 'high ground'. Though not relinquishing the military option (a number of GAM fighters and sympathisers have been killed during the delivery of foreign aid) Yudhoyono has not stood in the way of aid delivery, and, unlike previous Indonesian presidents, he is making a pitch for the hearts and minds of average Acehnese. If successful, GAM will be significantly weakened by this 'charm' offensive as Acehnese, eagre to rebuild their lives and knowing that they cannot do so without a cooperative relationship with Jakarta, reach out and accept Indonesian goodwill - no matter what strings are attached.

Perhaps under these circumstances it is no wonder that GAM peace negotiators are toying with the idea of dropping their demands for independence in favour of accepting Jakarta's proposal for 'special autonomy'. Dogmatically rejecting the Indonesian proposal at a time of mourning and when most survivors are focussed on reconstruction, would be the height of folly for GAM. Nonetheless, the long-term success of Yudhoyono's gambit depends on whether the apparent Acehnese-Javanese goodwill can be sustained after Aceh's post-tsunami reconstruction is complete. The animosity between Acehnese and Javanese communities is deep seated and it will take great self-discipline for both groups not to revert back to old habits. But for the short term at least, there is glimmer of hope that this long-standing conflict will get a temporary respite.