Asian Tsunami's strategic implications

That is; a temporary truce between two warring parties.

The 28-year conflict in Aceh seems to be drifting towards a settlement between members of the Free Aceh Movement, otherwise known by its acronym GAM and the Indonesian government.

The conflict in Aceh has been one of the most intractable in Southeast Asia. The more recent phase of this conflict began in 1976 when the GAM leadership, headed by Hasan di Tiro and Malik Mahmud, chose to reactivate guerrilla war against Jakarta in order to win the territory's independence from Indonesian rule. But unlike previous rebellious actions against Indonesian authorities, by the early-1970s, oil and gas was discovered in Aceh and this transformed the nature of the Acehnese-Indonesian conflict. Once Indonesian exploitation of Aceh's oil and gas resources began in the mid 1970s, it became obvious that these resources were critical to the growth of the Indonesian economy. But, not only was this clear to Indonesian policy makers under Suharto's New Order regime (1965-98), it was also clear to Acehnese rebels who believed that these same resources could allow Aceh to declare independence and sustain itself in the international community as an independent Islamic state. And so the age-old conflict between Aceh and the majority Javanese ethnic group (that controlled post-colonial Indonesia) changed from calls for Acehnese independence based on territory, ethnicity and differences in the forms of Muslim worship, to energy - the one commodity deemed vital to both Indonesia and the GAM leadership. Further fuelling that dispute was the perception that the oil and gas resources of Aceh were flowing out of the province and enriching the political elite in Jakarta at the expense of the Acehnese people. This perception provided the GAM leadership with an important political platform which galvanised Acehnese discontent over Indonesian control. Initially the GAM rebellion did not go well. The guerrillas were out-trained and out-armed by the counter-insurgency forces of the Indonesian military (TNI). Indeed by the early 1980s di Tiro, Mahmud and the rest of the GAM leadership were forced to flee the province, many receiving sanctuary in Sweden where they remained. GAM field commanders, however, continued their assault on Indonesian garrisons and other symbols of Indonesian rule within Aceh with 'hit and run' tactics and although 'semi-independent' from their distant political leadership, GAM commanders occasionally receive orders from those in exile to increase or decrease their actions against Indonesian authorities.

During the late 1990s, with the collapse of Suharto's military government (1998) in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Meltdown - some Acehnese believed that their independence was nigh. Many Indonesia watchers had considered East Timor's referendum on independence and the province's subsequent moves to independence in 1999 as signs that Indonesia was on the verge of collapse. This perception certainly was not helped by a succession of weak political leaders in Jakarta. Presidents Habibie, Wahid and Sukarnoputri (1999-2004) each had their own significant problems in steering Indonesia toward democracy after 32 years of military dictatorship.

In 2000, GAM and Indonesian peace negotiators met in Geneva in order to achieve a compromise deal that would see Aceh receive 'special autonomy' status if GAM gave up on independence. These talks failed and the Indonesian government resumed counter-insurgency operations. Renewed peace efforts were made in late 2002 when a cease-fire was announced between GAM and the TNI. Peace talks following this ceasefire were unsuccessful. Indonesian President Sukarnoputri launched a full-scale assault on GAM, deploying some 30,000 TNI soldiers, backed by 10,000 police. From May to December 2004, the approximately 5,000 GAM fighters were once again on the military defensive - and then the tsunami struck with devastating force. If we consider that between 1976-2004 during the GAM separatist struggle around 12,000 lives were lost, the number of lives taken by the Asian Tsunami in Aceh on a single day is estimated by the Indonesian Health Ministry as 166,320 and 50,000 missing - a mammoth toll. And while GAM commanders insist that the tsunami caused little damage to their paramilitary capabilities, (much of the guerrilla group retreated to the mountain areas of their troubled province prior to the tsunami), GAM's ability to recruit new fighters is considerably damaged. With much of the Acehnese capital, Bandar Aceh, and other significant coastal communities destroyed, priorities are focussed on aid delivery and reconstruction - not independence. Jakarta's ability to control the arrival and distribution of foreign aid to the stricken province placed GAM on the political back-foot and gave Indonesia the advantage.

The Indonesian government is now in a very interesting position. Desperate to bring the war to a favourable conclusion, and unable to force the Acehnese into giving up their struggle for independence by force alone, Jakarta has used a combination of military force and deft diplomacy to coax GAM back to the negotiating table. Indonesia's new president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, almost 100 days into his first term, seized the 'opportunity' the tsunami provided. By visiting the province and appearing genuinely concerned over the plight of the Acehnese, Yudhoyono has certainly captured the public relations 'high ground'. Though not relinquishing the military option (a number of GAM fighters and sympathisers have been killed during the delivery of foreign aid) Yudhoyono has not stood in the way of aid delivery, and, unlike previous Indonesian presidents, he is making a pitch for the hearts and minds of average Acehnese. If successful, GAM will be significantly weakened by this 'charm' offensive as Acehnese, eagre to rebuild their lives and knowing that they cannot do so without a cooperative relationship with Jakarta, reach out and accept Indonesian goodwill - no matter what strings are attached.

Perhaps under these circumstances it is no wonder that GAM peace negotiators are toying with the idea of dropping their demands for independence in favour of accepting Jakarta's proposal for 'special autonomy'. Dogmatically rejecting the Indonesian proposal at a time of mourning and when most survivors are focussed on reconstruction, would be the height of folly for GAM. Nonetheless, the long-term success of Yudhoyono's gambit depends on whether the apparent Acehnese-Javanese goodwill can be sustained after Aceh's post-tsunami reconstruction is complete. The animosity between Acehnese and Javanese communities is deep seated and it will take great self-discipline for both groups not to revert back to old habits. But for the short term at least, there is glimmer of hope that this long-standing conflict will get a temporary respite.