Asian Tsunami's strategic implications (page 1 of 2)

That is; a temporary truce between two warring parties.

The 28-year conflict in Aceh seems to be drifting towards a settlement between members of the Free Aceh Movement, otherwise known by its acronym GAM and the Indonesian government.

The conflict in Aceh has been one of the most intractable in Southeast Asia. The more recent phase of this conflict began in 1976 when the GAM leadership, headed by Hasan di Tiro and Malik Mahmud, chose to reactivate guerrilla war against Jakarta in order to win the territory's independence from Indonesian rule. But unlike previous rebellious actions against Indonesian authorities, by the early-1970s, oil and gas was discovered in Aceh and this transformed the nature of the Acehnese-Indonesian conflict. Once Indonesian exploitation of Aceh's oil and gas resources began in the mid 1970s, it became obvious that these resources were critical to the growth of the Indonesian economy. But, not only was this clear to Indonesian policy makers under Suharto's New Order regime (1965-98), it was also clear to Acehnese rebels who believed that these same resources could allow Aceh to declare independence and sustain itself in the international community as an independent Islamic state. And so the age-old conflict between Aceh and the majority Javanese ethnic group (that controlled post-colonial Indonesia) changed from calls for Acehnese independence based on territory, ethnicity and differences in the forms of Muslim worship, to energy - the one commodity deemed vital to both Indonesia and the GAM leadership. Further fuelling that dispute was the perception that the oil and gas resources of Aceh were flowing out of the province and enriching the political elite in Jakarta at the expense of the Acehnese people. This perception provided the GAM leadership with an important political platform which galvanised Acehnese discontent over Indonesian control. Initially the GAM rebellion did not go well. The guerrillas were out-trained and out-armed by the counter-insurgency forces of the Indonesian military (TNI). Indeed by the early 1980s di Tiro, Mahmud and the rest of the GAM leadership were forced to flee the province, many receiving sanctuary in Sweden where they remained. GAM field commanders, however, continued their assault on Indonesian garrisons and other symbols of Indonesian rule within Aceh with 'hit and run' tactics and although 'semi-independent' from their distant political leadership, GAM commanders occasionally receive orders from those in exile to increase or decrease their actions against Indonesian authorities.

During the late 1990s, with the collapse of Suharto's military government (1998) in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Meltdown - some Acehnese believed that their independence was nigh. Many Indonesia watchers had considered East Timor's referendum on independence and the province's subsequent moves to independence in 1999 as signs that Indonesia was on the verge of collapse. This perception certainly was not helped by a succession of weak political leaders in Jakarta. Presidents Habibie, Wahid and Sukarnoputri (1999-2004) each had their own significant problems in steering Indonesia toward democracy after 32 years of military dictatorship.

In 2000, GAM and Indonesian peace negotiators met in Geneva in order to achieve a compromise deal that would see Aceh receive 'special autonomy' status if GAM gave up on independence. These talks failed and the Indonesian government resumed counter-insurgency operations. Renewed peace efforts were made in late 2002 when a cease-fire was announced between GAM and the TNI.